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Keynote Address

Urban Health and the Social Contract: Poverty, Race, and Death
H. Jack Geiger, MD'

F

or more than three decades our nation has been concemed
about a health care crisis; those three words are now almost
a part of our national culture. The reasons for the prolonged and
intense discussion on the health care crisis are well known, and
there is no need to review them in great detail at the outset. We
all have heard repeatedly about the inexorably rising share ofthe
gross national product (GNP) that is consumed by the health
care sy.stem. We all have heard about the millions of uninsured
and underinsured. We know the staggering amounts of total
health care spending; $604 billion in 1989, or $2,354 per person—40% greater than the per capita expenditure in Canada and
double the mean ofthe 24 industrialized countries in the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. U.S.
Budget Director Richard Darman estimates that, at the present
rate, total public and private spending for health care will consume 17% of our GNP by the year 2000 and 37%—more than
one-third of our total economy—by 2030 (1).
Cost is only one of the issues. We all have heard the stories of
care curtailed or denied and of patients who have delayed even
seeking care—something that happens 12 times more frequently among the poor and uninsured (2). We all know the consequences in morbidity and mortality.
Similarly, almost everyone by now is familiar with the usual
roster of assigned villains; an open-ended insurance system with
huge administrative costs and a nightmare of documentation requirements for patients and providers alike; the uninhibited introduction of new technologies, whether or not they are cleariy
beneficial or cost-effective; the increasing health burden of
an aging population; acquired immunodeficiency syndrome
(AIDS) and substance abuse epidemics; the maldistribution of
health care resources; unrealistic expectations on the part of patients; malpractice suits; medical greed. The list is endless.
There is ample evidence against each of the accu.sed. For example, in a recent newspaper report (3) on the proliferation of
hugely expensive magnetic resonance imaging machines owned
by networks of physicians with a financial motivation to refer
the maximum possible number of patients, the physician/investor in an imaging center in Atianta was quoted as saying, "tf
there's more profit in it, what's wrong with that? ...This is an
entrepreneurial society."
What is relatively more recent, after decades of this debate, is
the emergence of urban health care as the most acute and dan-
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gerous component of the national crisis. Again, we tend to focus
first on cost. The nation's IOO public hospitals, which are the
only real form of "national health insurance" in metropolitan areas, have an average annual deficit of $9 million. Bad debts and
charity care account for 42% of their charges, and 30% of their
inpatient days and 52% of their outpatient visits are by uninsured patients (4). In Chicago, the newest public hospital bed
was opened in 1925. Public hospitals are in critical condition,
made worse by the inadequacy in coverage and in reimbursement rates of Medicaid, which also deprives the poor of access
to private physicians.
In a Community Service Society study (5) of nine tow-income minority communities in New York City, only 28 primary
care physicians had hospital privileges and were fully accessible
to the 1.7 million residents in those areas. One ofthe most deprived areas was central Harlem, which in 1985 had a death rate
87% higher than the New York City average. The study noted:
"The main victims in Harlem are working age adults.
Compared to New York City as a whole, the death rate for
people aged 15-44 in Hariem was 240 percent higher; for
those 44-65 of age, it was 128 percent higher. These were
not deaths that arose from violence and drugs: the leading
killers in Harlem were cancer, heart attack, hypertensive
disease, pneumonia, diabetes, bronchitis. Not coincidentally, this is the same community that is documented here
to have four fully functioning physicians to provide basic
health care for its 214,000 inhabitants."
That survey included health districts with an infant mortality
rate of 69.9 per 1,000 live births, about the same as Kenya's. For
every infant death, approximately 100 babies are bom with low
birthweight, or addicted to drugs, or suffering from congenital
anomalies or other conditions, many of them preventable.
The inner cities, in short, are islands of illness and premature
death within the larger society, suffering epidemics of AIDS, tu-
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berculosis, hepatitis A, syphilis, gonorrhea, measles, complicated ear infections, and lung cancer. McCord and Freeman (6),
whose survival analysis of age-adjusted mortality rates found
that black men in Harlem are less likely to reach the age of 65
than men in Bangladesh, identified 53 other health districts in
New York City—they called them "natural-disaster areas"—in
which mortality rates for the < 65 age group were at least twice
the expected rates. Death comes sooner—and after inadequate
treatment—from cancer, heart disease, and diabetes. These are
sentinel events, indicators not merely of the crumbling of the urban health care system but of larger changes in our society.
Before discussing those changes, I should note one factor that
has remained distressingly constant; the rhetoric of reform.
JAMA may devote an entire issue to a wide spectrum of proposals, ranging from the American Medical Association's own
ideas to the proposals of the Physicians for a National Health
Program, but political statements continue to be bland. Consider
a recent comment by George Mitchell, the majority leader of the
U.S. Senate; "The Congress and the Administration must provide leadership and insurance reform, cost containment strategies and expanded coverages for the poor and the elderly, for
both the public and the private sector." But Daniel Greenberg,
writing from Washington for a British medical joumai (7),
noted;
"The rhetoric of crisis is intense, but the pressure for
change is not focused. Meanwhile, the prospering health
care industry is at the ramparts to protect its good fortune.
The most informed, politically concemed elements of the
population know about the failings of the system mainly
from second-hand reports rather than personal experience... the despairing critiques of the health care system
are familiar, and so is the likelihood that major reforms
and access and cost containment will conrinue to prove
elusive."
The long and dismal history of failure to introduce fundamental change, at least since the reforms of 1965, is one reason for
some pessimism. There is, however, a deeper reason, and it constitutes my central theme,
I submit that any hope of truly reforming the American health
care system is illusory without first, or at least simultaneously,
effecting a fundamental change in our overall national social,
economic, and racial policies, the set of understandings as to the
responsibilities and limits of govemment that we call a social
contract, t submit that we cannot, we wilt not, transform one part
of that social contract in isolation from all the others, even a part
as huge, asflawed,and as important as health care without confronting the need for broader social change. That, in tum, requires us to confront the barriers to such social change, to understand what has been happening to the social contract over the
last 20 years, and how, in the main, that was accomplished.
These recent changes comprise the most significant redefinition
ofthe social contract since the innovations ofthe 1960s, which
were in turn the biggest changes since the 1930s and the New
Deal.
These changes of the 1980s—not the health care system per
se—bear major responsibility for the desperate problems we
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now confront in the health status of many of our populations.
These changes in the social contract have been documented in
exquisite detail by the Congressional Budget Office and published by the House Committee on Ways and Means, and many
of the following data on income shifts are drawn from that
source (8). The changes ofthe t980s include:
1. The redistribution of wealth upwards to those in the top
20% of family incomes, and within that group, most intensely,
to the top 1%.
The inner cities are islands of illness and premature death within the larger society... Death
comes sooner — and after inadequate treatment —from cancer, heart disease, and diabetes. These are sentinel events, indicators not
merely of the crumbling of the urban health
care system but of larger changes in our society.
2. The redistribution of both income and opportunity away
from the middle class and the poor, an effort directed most intensely at the bottom 20%, those at or below 150%> of the socalled poverty line.
3. The deliberate erosion—in some sectors, the destruction—
of govemmental responsibility and support for assistance in
housing, education, nutrition, environmental protection, the creation of employment opportunities, and, not least, health care. In
my own state of New York, for example, with its long record of
innovation and leadership in the development of low-income
public housing, only one project that might qualify for inclusion
in that category is planned for 1992: the building of 3,000 new
jail cells.
4. The virtual abandonment of federal support for cities, in direct proportion, I believe, to the concentrations of the poor and,
above all, of blacks and Hispanics in urban centers, so that for a
decade our cities have steadily and increasingly grown more
black, brown, and broke.
5. The widespread acceptance of the belief that it is govemment itself, together with the poor and minorities themselves,
that are the cau.se of our economic and social difficulties. Thus,
those whom we once regarded as the victims of an inequitable
society are now presented to us as the cause of inequity, especially as inequity is perceived by a struggling middle class.
There has been constructed for us a new social entity, the "black
underclass," in terms that emphasize personal behaviors (9) and
ignore massive changes in the labor market and huge inequalities in educational spending, as a way of defining and explaining
the growing class polarization of American society (10.11).
These changes—in both policies and beliefs—were the result
of a sustained political effort, one that is ongoing still. The very
core of that effort, I suggest, is the deliberate attempt to deepen
the racial fault line that has always existed in American social,
economic, and political life. We are told that our national difficulties are due to the behaviors of (and the special privileges allegedly afforded to) minorities, and that the only vestige of racism we now confront is affirmative action itself. (This in a na-
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tion in which a 1990 survey conducted by the National Opinion
Research Center [12] at the University of Chicago found that a
majority of whites—on some questions, as high as 78%—believe blacks and Hispanics prefer welfare to hard work, tend to
be lazy, are more prone to violence, less intelligent than whites,
and are less patriotic!)
Let me present some statistics on some of the dimensions of
these changes, drawn mostly from Congressional Budget Office
data (which, for technical reasons, are substantially more accurate than Bureau of the Census analyses) and summarized recently by the Center on Budget and Policy Priorities (13);
From 1977 to 1988, the average after-tax income of the poorest fifth of households fell 10%, after adjusting for inflation.
The middle fifth of households experienced an average aftertax income gain of less than 4% over this period. The share of
the national income going to the middle class—the 60% of U.S.
households in the middle of the income spectrum—received
50.6% of att after-tax income in 1977; by 1988, its share had
dropped to 46.3%.
By contrast, the top fifth of households realized an average
gain in after-tax income of 34%. In 1988, the wealthiest onefifth of the population received as much after-tax income as the
other 80% of the population combined.
The Center on Budget and Policy Priorities also points out
that the average after-tax income of the richest 1 % of Americans
more than doubled from 1977 to 1988, rising 122% after adjusting for inflation, from $203,000 in 1977 to $451,000 in 1988. In
other words, the richest 1% (2.5 million Americans) now have
neariy as much income as the bottom 40% combined (100 million Americans with the lowest incomes).
These changes, while due mainly to increa.sed disparities in
before-tax incomes, were exacerbated by changes in federal tax
policies; since 1977, the richest Americans have received large
tax reductions, while middle-income Americans have not. Between 1977 and 1992 (allowing for the impact of tax provisions
in the 1991 budget agreement), the effective tax rate—that is,
the percentage of income paid in all federal taxes combined—
borne by the richest 1% will have declined by 18%. During this
same period, the percentage of income that middle-income
households pay in taxes is expected to increase from 19,5% to
19,7%,
Down at the economic bottom, something different was happening, tn 1977, a family of four at the poverty tine paid no federal income tax at atl and also received a tax credit that offset
most of their social security payroll taxes, so their combined income and tax liabilities came to only a little under 2% of their
family income. By 1986, that same family was paying tO.5% of
their income in income and payroll taxes, a sixfold increase.
From 1977 to 1990, the mean income of the poorest fifth of
families fell by 14% in constant dollars. Some have argued that
this is due to the changing composition of households in the bottom quintile, with a marked increase in the proportion of femaleheaded households and the elderly. However, data from the
House Committee on Ways and Means (8) indicate that, white
there have been some demographic shifts, 43% of the increase in
poverty between 1979 and 1989 was due to reductions in benefit
programs at federal, state, and local levels, especially cuts in Aid
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to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) and in unemployment insurance.
Thus, from 1970 to 1991, the maximum AFDC benefit for a
family of three with no other income declined 42% in the typical
state, after adjusting for inflation. The average vatue of AFDC
and food stamps combined has fatten to about the same level as
the value of AFDC benefits alone in 1960, before the food
stamp program was created, tn 1972, a mother with two children
who eamed wages equal to 75% of the poverty line would have
been eligible for some AFDC assistance in 49 states. In 1980,
she would still have been eligible in 42 states. By 1990, her family could qualify for AFDC in only six states. The disposable income (including after-tax eamings, AFDC, food stamps, and the
eamed income credit) of a mother with two children who eamed
wages equal to 75% of the poverty line was $3,100 tower in
1990 than in 1972. tn New York City, holding household composition constant, the poverty rate for female-headed households increased from 41% in 1969 to 63% in 1987(14).
Overall, Congressionat Budget Office statistics show that
between 1979 and 1989, reductions in welfare programs like
AFDC added 2.2 million people to the poverty rolls, while reductions in social insurance programs like unemployment insurance added nearly 1 million. Thus, during these years, the social
safety net was being shredded and those at the bottom were falling through the gaping new holes. Almost every variety of public program was reduced, dismanded, or effectively limited in
scope by draconian eligibility requirements. In Texas, for example, eligibility for Medicaid for a family of four is restricted to
those with an income less than $2,200 per year, or about $ 1.50 a
day per person for food, housing, clothing, and all the other
costs of living (15).
It is these cuts, as much as reductions in health care funding
per se, and combined with recession and unemployment, that
have put the homeless out on the streets and the sick poor into

Any hope of truly reforming the American
health care system is illusory without effecting
a fundamental change in our overall national
social, economic, and racial policies... We
cannot, we will not, transform one part ofthat
social contract in isolation from all the others,
even a part as huge, as flawed, and as important as health care without confronting the
needfor broader social change.

the public hospital—or jail. The change in the social contract
has created the conditions that so profoundly threaten the health
of urban communities.
The urban statistics on morbidity and mortality are frightening, txt me cite ju.st one poignant example involving children.
The St. Louis Children's Hospital has reported a small epidemic (31 cases) of water intoxication—previously a rare condition—among poor infants over these last 15 years. All 31 infants
lived in poverty and were fed excessive water; the most frequent
reason was that their mothers ran low on formula and had to di-
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lute it or substitute water. Most of the cases occurred in the last
three years, a time when previously available free sources of formula disappeared (16).
I cannot help but contrast these pattems of redistribution with
the one attempt at redistribution to the poor—and the minorities
who are suffering most—that was offered recently by the current administration in Washington. The White House proposed
to launch a new initiative against the highly visible and acutely
embarrassing infant mortality rates in the inner cities—and to
fund it by taking $54 million away from current community
health center programs and matemal and child health block
grants, major existing sources of protection against infant mortality for the urban poor and the less visible rural areas. In other
words, it is wrong to redistribute income but not to redistribute
death.
Race is used as an issue to divide populations that in reality
have common interests and common suffering. Only one of ten
poor children in 1989 was black and living in a female-headed
household on welfare in a major city. More poor children live
outside than inside big cities, and nearly two-thirds of all poor
families have only one or two children. Also, a majority of poor
families with children had at least one worker and a paycheck,
not a welfare check, as the family's largest source of income.
Poverty is not race-blind, but neither is it race-specific, and it
does not match the stereotypic images presented to us repeatedly by the media.
Race is frequentiy raised as an issue and coupled with an attack on the old social contract. President Bush, in a recent
speech, said the Great Society programs of the t960s, the embodiment of a social contract invoking govemment responsibility, had discouraged individuals from becoming good workers,
that the crusade against poverty had backfired, that civil rights
programs had "generated animosity," and that welfare programs
had made poor people dependent on govemment. The charge of
failure, for obvious reasons, omitted any reference to the fotlowing hugely beneficial and successful programs embodying that
social contract; federal aid to elementary and secondary schools,
Headstart, the Voting Rights Act of 1965, the Fair Housing Act
of 1968, Medicare for the elderly and Medicaid for the poor, the
nationwide food stamp program, environmental laws, and the
network of community health centers. Instead, the President
suggested a "good society" in which individuals perform private
acts of common decency and become "points of light." That social contract is called noblesse oblige, and it has left us with
10,000 new points of blight.
What has happened to us, as a nation, to account for this great
change in our social orientation? One ofthe most perceptive and
eloquent statements has come not from a political commentator
but from a playwright and dramatist. Steven Tussich (17) wrote:
"We are fleeing, as we have for decades, from the unfulfilled pledge that we are "one nation, under God, with
liberty and justice for all.' The hopeless despair of our
millions, the third-world poverty in the heart of our cities,
the resulting tidal wave of crime, this social rot at our very
heart, have become as dangerous as any nuclear waste
dump. Lacking the resolve to confront these problems, we
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are fleeing from them in all directions: to the suburbs, to
cities and other parts of the country, to other countries, to
other wars,
"But we have been doing this for a long time. The social diseases of racism, poverty, drug addiction and
crime, never fully addressed, were allowed to fester or
grow... the problems that took generations of neglect to
create require the patient dedication of generations to
undo. But we have become a nation that no longer seems
to have the will, the vision or the deep-seated conviction
to measure its endeavors by generations...
"During the '80s, in a very violent way, the rich got
richer, and in an even more violent way, the poor got
poorer... We have now become that most worri.some of
super-powers: isolationists in regard to problems at home
and interventionists in regard to the problems of other nations... We have come to rely on extemal enemies for
comfort and confirmation of our identity as a people."

And then, of course, we can claim that we are Number One. tt
should be no surprise, then, as Dr. Seth Foldy (18) pointed out at
Henry Ford Hospital's first Urban Health Care Symposium, that
we are first in the world in narcotics addiction, first in handgun
homicides, seventh in spending on public education, and 18th in
reducing infant mortality. I would add another item; we are first
in the world in the percent of our adult population in prison, surpassing even South Africa.
Pessimism—and the picture I have drawn of the task that confronts us is a gloomy one—is nevertheless no reason for inaction. Let me offer, therefore, a modest suggestion for one health
care reform and one account of a basis for optimism.
The community health center movement was one of the important innovations of the 1960s in both urban and rural health
care for the poor. Numerous, careful studies in the 1970s demonstrated that such centers provided high-quality, accessible,
and comprehensive care, lowered hospitalization rates and
emergency room use, improved health status, and were highly
cost-effective (19-22). There is a proposal in draft legislation in
the Congress to quadruple their number—now approximately
600 nationwide, serving some 6 million low-income people—
over the next five years. The earlier studies strongly suggest that
the costs of this expansion would be repaid rapidly in reduced
hospitalization, in the reduction of the present burdens on both
public and voluntary hospitals, in reduced infant mortality and
disability rates, in increased immunization, and in early and effective treatment for substance abuse.
However, there is a limitation: the desperate shortage of
health personnel, especially physicians, willing to work in the
inner city and in such settings. Community health centers are already close to crippled by personnel shortages. The latter-day
structure of the National Health Service Corps and all of the
quid-pro-quo state programs will still provide a scholarship or a
loan to pay medical school tuitions on the promise that the recipients will "pay back" with several years of service in medically
underserved areas. But there is always a buy-out. tn New York,
at least, with three such separate programs, the results are almost
uniform; about 20% of all those in medical school who have received such help eventually work in underserved areas; 50% to
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60% buy out—go to the bank with their MD degrees and their
residency requirements completed and negotiate a loan to repay
the penalty for refusing such service. Another 20% to 30% are
simply lost to follow-up. The system just does not work.
The reasons are not just economic. I believe many physicians
and other health personnel feel that by working in community
health centers and other institutions in the inner city, they would
be out of the mainstream of medicine, marginalized in lowstatus jobs in difficult circumstances without social or professional support.
There is a resource that we have not tapped; the professional
societies—the American College of Physicians, the American
Academy of Family Practice, the American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, and the like. They could contribute to
solving this problem by creating a category of special and real—
not merely honorary—public service fellowship status for graduating residents who choose to serve in inner cities and rural
poverty areas. Such service could accrue special credit toward
fellowship status in those professional societies. The societies
could undertake to provide ongoing educational and other support—senior mentors, advice on simple health care and clinical
series research, and participation in annual meetings for the
usual two- or three-year duration of service.
Ultimately, my contention is that we need a public interest/
public sector medical school in many of our major cities, uniting
public universities, public hospitals, and health departments.
Conventional medical education, with the best will in the world,
is not interested in or committed to this kind of service. We need
schools capable of providing special training appropriate to the
needs and problems of the urban and rural poor, just as we have
a Uniformed Services Medical School that provides special
training for the needs of the military.
Such schools could draw upon the vast reservoir of untapped
human resources in the very populations we aim to serve. The
medical school at which t teach, forexample, usually has 25% to
35% black and Hispanic students. Most of the student body
come from low-income families; many are the first in their families to go to college, let alone medical school. Indeed, social
class may be more important than ethnicity; we are creating the
first working-class medical school since the Flexner Report.
Recognizing these untapped resources has much to do with
how we think about the poor and with what the poor think about
themselves; the expectations they mount and the beliefs they
hold about their futures. We are most often taught that the poor
and their communities, rural or urban, are sinkholes of pathology. The pathology is real, but these communities are also reservoirs of enormous (and unacknowledged) strength, resilience,
and ability. We need an epidemiology of strengths, not merely
of pathologies, to recognize that,
I first became convinced of the reality of this reservoir of
strength when I worked with colleagues in rural Mississippi, in
what was then the third poorest county in the United States, in a
health center that served a target area of some 500 square miles,
with a population of 14,000 blacks and several thousand poor
whites, with an annual family income (in 1966) of less than
$900 per year, with a median educational level of fifth or sixth
grade in miserably poor schools. As part of the health center pro-
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gram, we launched a modest educational enterprise, taught by
the center's professional staff at night; a high school equivalency certificate program, and a college preparatory program for
those who had a more complete education. We opened a small
office of education at the health center to help end the isolation
of this population from other institutions and to help them apply
to colleges and professional schools and for financial aid—resources that had been kept from these people by the prevailing
social structure for many years.
tn the first decade, from this poor county and the few surrounding counties very much like it, that effort produced seven
black physicians, five black PhDs, one person who has just completed a term as a state mental health commissioner, two full
The community health center movement was
one of the important innovations of the 1960s
in both urban and rural health care for the
poor. There is a proposal in draft legislation in
the Congress to quadruple their number over
the next five years. The costs of this expansion
would be repaid rapidly in reduced hospitalization, in the reduction ofthe present burdens on
both public and voluntary hospitals, in reduced
infant mortality and disability rates, in increased
immunization, and in early and effective treatment for substance abuse.
professors at prestigious universities, more than 20 registered
nurses, about a dozen social workers, and the first 12 black registered sanitarians in Mississippi's history. One young woman,
a sharecropper's daughter with a ninth-grade education and six
children who joined our staff as a trainer of aides at age 26, now
holds my former job as Executive Director of the health center—and she has a doctorate in sociat work and has put all ofher
children through college. These data and anecdotes are a measure of the potential that exists in the populations we .serve.
My argument, then, is that we have to do more than repair the
health care system. We have to confront head-on the maldistributions t have described. We have to work to redefine the social
contract yet again. This is not an argument to postpone health
care reform until these larger tasks are accomplished; on the
contrary, we must try to use health care reform as an explicit and
deliberate tool for reform in the social contract.
Our task is illustrated by a true story, an experience that I
found deeply moving. It serves as a metaphor for the attempts
we have to undertake. In 1957, when t was a third-year medical
student at the then Westem Reserve University, I seized the opportunity to go to what seemed to be the best department of social medicine then in the world—^of all places, in South Africa,
at the one medical school then open to nonwhites. The department ran two comprehensive teaching community health centers, one in a periurban African township near Durban, and the
other in what was then called a rural Zulu tribal reserve of about
500 square miles. I worked in both centers, and the experience
changed my life. These were the models for the first two community health centers my colleagues and I later launched in the
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United States, at the Columbia Point Housing Project in Boston
and in Mound Bayou, Mississippi.
A few years later, under Grand Apartheid, the South African
centers were closed. Ten years later, the great social epidemiologist John Cassel, who had worked at Polela, the rural center, retumed to see if there were any identifiable residual effects. He
found only one; a continuing and increased level of educational
aspiration and achievement in the population served by the
health center.
A few years ago, in connection with some of the work of the
Committee for Health in Southem Africa, physicians from
South Africa and from the African National Congress (ANC), in
exile, came to an intemational workshop in New York. There I
met Dr. Nkosasane Zuma, an ANC physician exiled in London.
I asked her where in South Africa she was bom. "Polela," she
said, and ultimately we calculated that she had been a child
when t was there as a medical student. I asked her if it was true
that the Polela health center had such an impact on educational
aspiration.
"Oh, yes," she said. "In the first generation, many people got
educated and some were professionally trained as doctors and
teachers and lawyers. In the next generation—mine—people
got educated but also became politically militant and active. But
this was true only for part ofthe tribal reserve. It happened ifyou
were close to the health center, saw the role models, saw the interactions among people of different races, saw what education
meant in the lives of people. But you also had to live in the part
of the reserve that was near the highway."
That made no sense. "Why is that?" I asked. She said, "Because you really had to understand that there was a road out."
tt seems to me that our task is to join with the people we serve
in finding, creating, and demonstrating that there is a road out of
poverty, rural or urban, a road out of racism, a road out of inequity, a change in the society that could follow in part from
change in the health care system but without which such change
will not take place. There is no more challenging or moving opportunity in our work.
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